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THE DESTRUCTIBILITY OF CONTINGENT
REMAINDERS IN MISSOURI
WILLARD L. ECKHARDT*
"Let the sleeping dog lie." '
It has been asserted that the common law doctrine of destructibility
exists in Missouri. It is the purpose of this article to show that this rule
based on the obsolete doctrine of seisin ought not to exist in Missouri, and
that under existing statutes and decisions this rule does not exist in
Missouri.
I. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE 1o DESTRUCTIBILITY OF CONTINGENT
RE1AINDERS
2
So long as the feudal system was a functioning institution in both its
political and economic aspects, there was vital significance in the rule that
someone always must be seised of the land, in order to provide a respon-
sibility for and a continuity of services. Conveyances were accomplished
by a livery of seisin, which had to be a presently effective act. There was
no difficulty in the conveyance of a fee simple absolute:
A enfeoffs B and his heirs.
The doctrine of seisin had a stagnating effect, however, on the creation
of future interests in land in persons other than the grantor. There are at
least three possible types of such future interests. (1) The first type is
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B. S., University of
Illinois, 1935, LL. B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. Accord: CHAUCER, Troilus and Criseyde III, 764; ALESSANDRO ALLEGRI,
Rime e Prose. Compare COUNTRYMAN, New Commonwealth (1647) (lion);
SHAxESPARE, Henry IV, Part 2, act 1, sc. 2, 1. 174 (wolf); NuR Ez, DE: GUZmAN,
Refranes, Salamanca (cat).
2. This explanation of the common law doctrine of the destructibility of
contingent remainders is intended to refresh the memories of lawyers who have
forgotten this learning, and to provide a simplified background for lawyers who
perchance never have explored our great heritage of English property law.
Citations of authorities have been omitted, and oversimplification in order
to achieve sharp delineation results in some inaccuracies. No attempt is made
to rise above a purely verbal level. That is matter for another article.
The standard work in the field, indispensable to the lawyer dealing with
property, is a three volume treatise, SIMES, FuTuRE INTERESTS (1936).
(268)
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a future interest which is limited to come into possession without any
support from or connection with a previously limited estate:
A enfeoffs C and his heirs when C attains 21;
A enfeoffs B for life, then to C and his heirs one year after
B's death.
Such a future interest violated the rule that livery of seisin must be a
presently effective act, or that there could be no gap in seisin, and the
future interest was void.3  (2) Another possible type is a future interest
which is limited to take effect by cutting short a previously limited estate:
A enfeoffs B for life, but to C and his heirs when C is admitted
to the bar.
Such a future interest violated the doctrine that no one could take ad-
vantage of a condition except the grantor and his heirs. A more practical
reason is that B might give up possession only in face of C's superior army.
Furthermore, no future interest could be limited after a fee simple estate:
A enfeoffs B and his heirs, but if 0 marries D, then to C and
his heirs.
The future interest was void because it cut short a previously limited
estate and because it was a fee after a fee. (3) The third possible type
is a future interest limited to take effect in possession on the determination
of a previously limited estate:
A enfeoffs B for life, then to C and his heirs.
The common law permitted only this type of a future interest in persons
other than the grantor, and it was called a remainder. In the above
example seisin was transferred from A to B at the time of the feoffment,
and C took seisin from B. C's remainder is said to be vested,4 and it is
indestructible. If the limitation is,
A enfeoffs B for life, remainder to C and his heirs if C is
admitted to the bar,
C is said to have a contingent remainder, 5 that is, it is subject to a condi-
tion precedent. B takes seisin, and if C satisfies the condition before the
3. Compare the true-false examination question attributed to Professor
Hanna. "A enfeoffs B and his heirs from and after April 1 next. Is the date
appropriate?"
4. GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) 80: "A remainder is
vested in A, when, throughout its continuance; A, or A and his heirs, have the
right to the immediate possession, whenever and however the preceding freehold
estates may determine."
5. Ibid: "A remainder is contingent if, in order for it to come into posses-
sion the fulfillment of some condition precedent other than the determination of
the preceding freehold estates is necessary."
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termination of the life estate, his remainder becomes vested, and on the
termination of B's life estate seisin will pass to C. B's life estate, a free-
hold, is called a particular estate and supports the contingent remainder.
Because the condition precedent may never be satisfied, every contingent
remainder in fee is followed by a reversion in the grantor. This reversion
is said to be vested.6 If the condition is not satisfied at the determination
of B's life estate, A's reversion becomes possessory, and C's contingent
remainder is destroyed. The fact that C later satisfies the condition is
immaterial, and the fact that this result does violence to A's intention is
immaterial. If the land had not gone back to A, there would have been a
gap in seisin between the determination of B's life estate and the date when
C is entitled to possession. This could not be permitted. If the land
goes back to A, a subsequent transfer to C would be a transfer of seisin
taking place in the future, which was not permitted. There could be no
objection to the destructibility of contingent remainders so long as the
feudal system was the functioning organization of society.
Not every interest of the third type could be created. If the limita-
tion is,
A conveys to B for ten years, then to C and his heirs if he is
admitted to the bar,
the future interest is void. Possession and seisin are distinguished at
common law, the owner of an estate less than freehold (term for years)
having possession, and the owner of a freehold estate (life estate, fee tail,
and fee simple) having seisin. B takes possession only under his term
for years, and the limitation of the future interest is an attempt to transfer
seisin in the future when C satisfies the condition precedent.7  Hence the
rule is that a contingent remainder must be supported by a particular
estate of freehold. Only freeholders had the requisite seisin to carry to
the remainderman.
The type of destructibility referred to above, where C fails to satisfy
the condition precedent before B's death, may be called natural destruc-
tibility. B's life estate could be determined in other ways than by his
6. Id. at 91: "All reversions are vested interests. From their nature they
are always ready to take effect in possession whenever and however the preceding
estates determine."
7. An apparent exception is the limitation A conveys to B for ten years,
then to C and his heirs. This would seem to be an attempt to transfer seisin in
the future, but C's interest is held effective with the verbalization that C takeg
a fee simple absolute subject to a term of years. B received possession for him-
self, and seisin for C.
[Vol. 6
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death. If B, owning a life estate, should enfeoff X and his heirs, X acquires
a tortious fee simple. B's tortious feoffment would forfeit his life estate,
leaving no particular estate of freehold to support C's contingent remain-
der, and C's interest would be destroyed. This might be called artificial
destructibility. If A should convey his reversion to the life tenant B, or if
B should convey his life estate to the reversioner A, the life estate would
be determined by merger in the reversion. C's contingent remainder would
be destroyed because there would no longer be a particular state of free-
hold to support it. Merger became the most important method of artificial
destruction of contingent remainders.
Several techniques could be used to avoid destructibility. One of the
most frequently used devices was that of a trustee to preserve contingent
remainders:
A enfeoffs B for life, remainder to trustees for the life of B
to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to C and his heirs
if C is admitted to the bar.
If B's life estate were determined before his death, the vested remainder
in the trustees would come into possession to support C's contingent
remainder. The above limitation is effective to prevent an artificial
destruction of C's contingent remainder. In the same way trustees could
be provided to prevent a natural destruction of C's interest.
Seisin was a common law doctrine. Equity never recognized the
doctrine, with its stagnating effect on the creation of future interests.
Equity permitted the creation of all three types of future interests de-
scribed above, the springing type, the shifting type, and the successive type.
A bargains and sells to the use of B for life, then to the use of
C and his heirs if C is admitted to the bar.
A gap between B's equitable life estate and C's equitable contingent
remainder did not destroy the remainder, but equity gave effect to the
limitation according to A's intent. The rule is that an equitable contingent
remainder is indestructible.
The Statute of Uses8 turned equitable estates into legal estates of the
same quantum where one person was seised to the use of another. The
first problem to face the law courts was whether to recognize as valid
the new types of legal interests which law had formerly held void. These
8. 27 HEN. VIII, c. 10 (1536).
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new interests were the springing executory interest, where there was no
particular estate of freehold,
A bargains and sells to B and his heirs when B is admitted
to the bar;
A bargains and sells to B for life, and one year after B's
death to the use of C and his heirs if C is admitted to the bar,
and the shifting executory interest where the future interest cut short
a previously limited estate,
A bargains and sells to B and his heirs, but if C is admitted to
the bar, to C and his heirs.
These new legal interests were held valid, and in the celebrated case of
Pells v. Brown,9 were held indestructible. The next problem was the
effect of a limitation of an equitable interest of the type which could have
been created at common law without violating the common law restrictions
-the contingent remainder. If executory interests are indestructible, if
the feudal basis of the destructibility doctrine has been dead for several
hundred years, and if the destruction of contingent remainders does vio-
lence to the grantor's hitention, why should not contingent remainders
be held indestructible 71o
The true faith was reaffirmed in Purefoy v. Rogers,"- in which it
was held that an equitable contingent remainder made legal by the
Statute of Uses was destructible. ". . . if there be one rule of law
more sacred than another, it is this, that no limitation shall be construed to
be an executory or shifting use, which can by possibility take effect by
way of remainder . "12 It now appears why one must distinguish
so carefully between the contingent interests permitted by the common
law, and the contingent interests not recognized by the common law
before the Statute of Uses. The former are destructible even if equitable
in origin, the latter are indestructible.
The total harm resulting from the doctrine of destructibility of con-
tingent remainders, based on the obsolete doctrine of seisin, was not great
in England, where a highly trained conveyancing bar existed. The
destruction of a future interest subject to a condition precedent could be
9. Cro. Jac. 590 (K. B. 1620).
10. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it
was laid down in the reign of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule simply persists
from imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law (1907) 10 HARV.
L. REv. 457, 469.
11. 2 Wins. Saund. 380 (K. B. 1670).
12. Lord St. Leonards, in Cole v. Sewell, 4 D. & War. 1, 27 (1843).
[Vol. 6
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avoided by any lawyer who knew his precedents. Hard cases usually
were the result of the ignorance of the conveyancer. This, of course, did
not help the person who lost an estate contrary to the intention of the
grantor or testator whose unfortunate choice of a lawyer caused the
difficulty.
Thus the law stood in England in the early 1800's, before reform
legislation. This is the body of law some persons allege is part of the
Missouri common law in 1941.
II. REFORm iN ENGLAD
The nineteenth century was a period of great law reform. In
England, reform of the law of property which began in that century
culminated in the Law of Property Act, 1925.'3 In 1845 it was enacted
that a contingent remainder should not fail by reason of the determination
by forfeiture, surrender, or merger of any preceding estate of freehold.
14
This statute prevented destruction of contingent remainders in case of the
premature determination of the supporting estate of freehold, but did not
in terms preserve contingent remainders which had not vested at the
normal determination of the supporting estate.
Cunliffe v. Brancker 5 brought the matter to a head. Edmund Leigh
devised Blackaere to trustees for one hundred and twenty years if his
niece, Sarah, should so long live, to pay the rents to Sarah, then to her
husband John for life, then to the children of John and Sarah who should
survive Sarah. John died in 1871, survived by Sarah, who died in 1873.
This suit was to determine whether the children surviving Sarah were
entitled to the land, or whether the land was intestate property of Edmund
Leigh. The court held that the children had contingent remainders,
supported by John's life estate, and that the remainders failed not having
vested at the termination of the life estate. The term of years in the
trustees, not being a freehold, could not support a contingent remainder.
The intent to benefit the children was clear, but they lost because of
13. 15 GEo. V, c. 20 (1925).
14. "A contingent remainder, existing at any time after the 31st of December,
1844, shall be, and, if created before the passing of this act, shall be deemed to
have been, capable of taking effect, notwithstanding the determination, by for-
feiture, surrender, or merger, of any preceding estate of freehold in the same
manner, in all respects, as if such determination had not happened." 8 & 9 VIcT.
c. 106, § 8 (1845).
15. 3 Ch. D. 393 (1876).
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the draftsman's omission of a sufficient estate in the trustees to preserve
contingent remainders.
The sequel' to Cunliffe v. Brancker was the enactment of the Con-
tingent Remainders Act, 1877,1' in the following year. This act preserves.
contingent remainders which have not vested at the natural determination
of the particular estate.
III. REFORx iN ILLINOIS
The history of the destructibility doctrine in Illinois should be of
particular interest to Missouri lawyers.- In the leading case, Frazer v.
Supervisors of Peoria County,'8 A granted Blackacre to B and the heirs
of her body. The Illinois fee tail statute' gave B a life estate, and the
heirs of her body a contingent remainder. Before she had any children
B reconveyed by quitclaim deed to A, who had the reversion. A conveyed
by warranty deed to defendant, who in turn conveyed by warranty deed
to plaintiff. The suit was for breach of covenants of title, and rescission.
At common law the life estate and reversion would merge to determine
the particular estate which supported the contingent remainders, thus
destroying the contingent remainders and giving A a fee simple absolute.
The court held, however, that the remainder was indestructible because it
had been created by the fee tail statute.20 This conclusion was not neces-
sarily compelled by the statute, for its provisions were fully carried out
when the fee tail was converted into a life estate and contingent remainder.
16. Underhill, in A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM (1901) 295.
17. "Every contingent remainder created by any instrument executed after
the passing of this act, or by any will or codicil revived or republished by any
will or codicil executed after that date, in tenements or hereditaments of any
tenure, which would have been valid as a springing or shifting use or executory
devise or other limitation had it not had a sufficient estate to support it as a
contingent remainder, shall, in the event of the particular estate determining
before the contingent remainder vests, be capable of taking effect in all respects as
if the contingent remainder had originally been created as a springing or shifting
use or executory devise or other executory limitation." 40 & 41 VicT. c. 33 (1877).
18. 74 Ill. 282 (1874).
19. The Illinois statute is identical, except for punctuation, with the Missouri
statute.
Mo. RE . STAT. (1939) § 3498: "In cases where, by the common or statute
law of England, any person might become seized in fee tail of any lands, by
virtue of any devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, or by any other means
whatever, such person, instead of being seized thereof in fee tail, shall be deemed
and adjudged to be, and shall become, seized thereof for his natural life only; and
the remainder shall pass in fee simple absolute to the person to whom the estate
tail would, on the death of the first grantee, devisee or donee in tail, first pass
according to the course of the common law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant
or conveyance."
20. This case, based on a statute identical with the Missouri statute, should
be very persuasive authority in Missouri that contingent remainders created by
the fee tail statute are indestructible.
[Vol. 6
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It looked as though Illinois would reject the doctrine of destructibility of
contingent remainders.21 Madison v. Larmon,22 was a case involving life
estates and contingent remainders, but the question of destructibility was
not in issue. The trial court in its opinion, however, pointed out how the
contingent remainders could have been destroyed, citing Fearne and Gray.
The supreme court adopted the trial court's opinion in toto, and hence
adopted the dictum. 3
In 1905 Professor Kales argued that contingent remainders had become
indestructible at common law. 4 His argument was based on the expansion
of In re Lechmere & Lloyd25 to its logical conclusion. 2  Such a holding
was not apt to appear in England because of the Contingent Remainders
Acts of 1845 and 1877. "Why, however, should not some of our American
jurisdictions hold the children's interest indestructible? In most States
there is no statute, no binding decision upon the point, and no practice
of conveyancers by which titles depend upon the fact that contingent
remainders have been destroyed by forfeiture, surrender or merger. Here
then, if anywhere, we may look for the completion, by judicial decision,
of that law reform which Jessel inaugurated in Lechmere v. Lloyd
It is submitted, then, that in any American jurisdiction, even though its
land laws may be founded upon those of England, and though there may be
no Contingent Remainders Act in force, yet, if neither actual decision nor
the practice of conveyancers has settled the law to the contrary, it may fairly
be contended that there is practically no such future interest as a contingent
remainder, that is, there is no rule of law which says that a springing
future interest after a particular estate of freehold which may be turned
into a vested remainder, or take effect in possession eo instanti upon the
termination of the particular estate, must fail entirely unless it does so." 27
21. "It is believed, therefore, that the result reached by the Illinois Court
upon this occasion exhibits a strong inclination to get rid, by any possible means,
of the rule by which contingent future interests of the third class fail unless they
take effect by way of succession." Kales, Contingent Future Interests After a
Particular Estate of Freehold (1905) 21 L. Q. REv. 118, 137.
22. 170 II. 65, 48 N. E. 556 (1897).
23. Research has uncovered no such dictum in Missouri to encourage a
Bond v. Moore.
24. Kales, loc. cit. supra note 21.
25. 18 Ch. D. 524 (1881).
26. But see Jenks, Future Interests in Land 11 (1905) 21 L. Q. REV. 265,
contending that the destructibility of contingent remainders had not been done
away with by judicial decision, in answer to Kales' article on page 118 of the
same review.
The opposing arguments are summarized in Destructibility of Contingent
Remainders (1906) 19 HARV. L. REV. 546.
27. Kales, supra note 21, at 136-137.
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In the next year, 1906, Kales gave a scholarly address entitled "Reforms
in the Law of Future Interests Needed in Illinois" at a meeting of the
Law Club of Chicago.28 "There are several rules of law-all of feudal
origin-which either still expressly obtain in Illinois or at least have not
been repudiated. The original feudal reasons for these rules have long
since ceased to exist. If, then, they are now obsolete and absurd from
the modern point of view, the legislature ought to rid our law of them
. . . It must still be quite uncertain whether the ancient Rule making
contingent remainders destructible is the law of this state. (See 21
Law Quarterly Review, 118, for an argument that it is not the law here)
. . . Apparently, then, the Rule is law here. Thus far, no striking
use has been made of it, and no hard cases of its application have appeared
in our reports. But we are apt at any time to have presented the case
which caused the total abolition of the Rule in England in 1877. In
Cu~niffe v. Brancker the limitations were in substance to A for life and
then to such of A's children as survive A and his wife, B. A died first.
Sm GEoRaE JEssEL held that the gift to the children entirely failed. It
would, it is believed, be a most excellent move if the legislature would put
an end to the chance of such a result before a similar case actually arises
to throw scandal upon the law."12
Kales in 1906 was the scholar. Kales in 1908 was the advocate. Bond v.
Moore"0 on its facts was hardly a case "to throw scandal upon the law."
Testatrix in 1883 devised Blackaere to her son B for life, "but should he
die without children, then the estate . . . shall go to my nearest
relatives, in such proportions as the law in such cases does provide." B
was the sole heir, and admittedly had a life estate by the will, and the
reversion by descent. Later B married and had two children. In 1908 B
conveyed to X, and X reconveyed to B, for the express purpose of destroy-
ing by merger the gift to the testatrix' nearest relatives, in order to give
B a fee simple. B now seeks to register this title under the Torrens system.
The court held the title was entitled to registration. The first problem,
with which the dissent deals exclusively, is whether a remainder in favor
of B's children should be implied by reason of the words "die without
issue." The majority held no such remainder should be implied. The
next problem of construction arose because B was the sole heir, hence if
28. Kales, Reforms in the Law of Future Interests Needed in Illinois(1906) 1 IlL. L. REV. 311, 374.
29. Id. at 374-377.
30. 236 III. 576, 86 N. E. 386 (1908).
[Vol. 6
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the testatrix' "nearest relatives" are determined as of her death, B will
take the remainder. The court held, however, that the nearest relatives
were to be determined as of the life tenant's death, excluding B from the
class. The destructibility problem is squarely raised. The court sets out
the orthodox doctrine and adopts it. Frazer v. Supervisors of Peoria
County,81 was limited to its facts, a contingent remainder created by the
fee tail statute. Albert M. Kales was of counsel for the successful plaintiff,
and the opinion of the court reflects his masterly brief. One wonders what
the decision would have been had Kales prepared the defendant's brief
along the lines of his own earlier arguments. As suggested above, the
case was an easy one on the facts for the adoption of the destructibility
rule. The court could have given B a fee simple by a literal reading of the
limitation, ascertaining nearest relatives as of the testatrix' death. The
court gave B a fee simple by applying the destructibility rule. What
the court took from B with its right hand, it gave back to him with its left
hand. Under either construction the land stayed in the direct line of
descent.
Bond v. Moore was followed by such wholesale carnage as probably
never has been seen in any other jurisdiction.32  Testators' legitimate
intentions were reduced to rubble. Succeeding cases were hard cases, hard
enough "to throw scandal upon the law." A statute in 1921 settled the
problem as to limitations created after that date .3
In the meantime, the Illinois court in Biwer v. Martin,34 had adopted a
unique theory to limit the doctrine it had embraced with so much fervor
in Bond v. Moore. The same theory was applied in Marvin v. Donaldson,"
where A conveyed by warranty deed to B for life, remainder to her lineal
descendants. By descent and purchase B later acquired the reversion. The
court held the contingent remainders were not destroyed by merger,
because they had been created by a warranty deed. The grantor, who
held the reversion, and those claiming under him, were estopped by his
31. 74 Ill. 282 (1874).
32. Belding v. Parsons, 258 Ill. 422, 101 N. E. 570 (1913); Barr v. Gardner,
259 Ill. 256, 102 N. E. 287 (1913); Messer v. Baldwin, 262 Ill. 48, 104 N. E. 195(1914); Smith v. Chester, 272 111. 428, 112 N. E. 325 (1916); Blakeley v. Mansfield,
274 Ill. 133, 113 N. E. 38 (1916); Benson v. Tanner, 276 Ill. 594, 115 N. E. 191(1917).
33. ILL. RLV. STAT. (1937) c. 30, § 40: ". . . no future interest shall fail
or be defeated by the determination of any precedent estate or interest prior to
the happening of the event or contingency on which the future interest is limited
to take effect."
34. 294 Ill. 488, 128 N. E. 518 (1920).
35. 329 Ill. 30, 160 N. E. 179 (1928).
10
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warranty from destroying the contingent remainders. While the reasoning
of the case may be questionable, " its effect in limiting the destructibility
doctrine is desirable.
IV. M SOURI AUTHORITIES
A. Missouri Text Authorities
There is very little discussion of the destructibility problem in Mis-
souri by scholars. Silvers' treatise on Missouri Titles does not even
mention the destructibility rule in its 581 pages.37 This would indicate that
Silvers considered the doctrine no longer existed in Mfissouri, or else that
he overlooked the matter entirely. Gill in his treatise on Tax Titles"8 does
not discuss the destructibility rule, but does cite Fountain v. Starbueck,8t
which contains one of the most powerful statements against destructibility
in any jurisdiction.4 0  In his larger treatise on Missouri Titles,41 Gill is
evidently of the opinion that contingent remainders are not destructible.
He does not discuss the doctrine, although there are several references to
it.-2  Gill lumps all future interests in persons other than the grantor into
one amorphous class, remainders, thus recognizing no distinction between
contingent remainders and indestructible executory interests. 43 He doubts
if merger (the most frequent method of destruction) will' be permitted
contrary to the intent of the grantor.4 4
The two leading text authorities on Missouri property law, Silvers and
Gill, on which the bar of the state places great reliance, do not recognize
the existence of the destructibility rule. Would it be fair for courts to
36. 1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTER STS (1936) § 106: "It appears that there is no
historical basis for this doctrine. Just how a warranty of a contingent remainder
would effect its destructibility is difficult to see. If one of the incidents of such
a remainder is that the holders of the two vested estates between which it is
interjected have a power to extinguish it, then it would seem that the grantor
warranted it subject to that power."
37. SiLWvRs, MissouRi TiTLFs (2d ed. 1923).
38. GiLL, Missouni TAX TiTLrs (1938).
39. 209 S. W. 900 (Mo. 1919).
40. Gill, op. cit. supra note 38, at 73.
41. GILL, MissouRi TrrLEs (3d ed. 1931).
42. Id. at p. 52, and § 813.
43. Id. § 768: "The word remainder, as now loosely used, includes all future
interests, both valid common law remainders, and also those interests invalid as
common law remainders that formerly could only be created as uses (trusts) or
executory devises, because of their shifting or springing character."
44. Id. § 837: "Query as to whether a conveyance by the life tenant to a
remainderman or vice versa, merges the estate, as it is contrary to the intention
of the testator or grantor."
[Vol. 6
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apply a doctrine that is not current among members of the profession0-
that is, fair to the clients whose property is at stake ?
The law teachers are a little more cautious. Professor Manley 0.
Hudson, whose series of articles is the best work which has been done on
Missouri property law,47 did not discuss at any length the problem of
destructibility. He assumed, however, that the rule did exist in the absence
of statutory abrogation.4 8  Professor Cullen assumes that contingent re-
mainders are destructible in his article dealing with the rule of Whitby v.
Mitchell, and the applicability of the rule against perpetuities to contingent
remainders.49 He cites no Missouri authorities.
In a recent article, Ely discussed the question whether contingent
remainders created by the fee tail statute can be destroyed. He concludes
that theoretically they are destructible by merger or tortious feoffment,
but finds no decision so holding. 0 He makes a fetish of free alienability
of land, and urges that the courts permit the destruction of contingent
remainders created by the fee tail statute in order to increase alienability.,'
In summary, Silvers and Gill, the books on titles most frequently used
by the profession, ignore the destructibility problem, leading to the infer-
ence that no such rule exists. The law teachers, Hudson and Cullen, out
of an extreme of caution, and in the absence of authority, assume the rule is
still in force because it was a common law rule. A practicing lawyer, Ely,
argues that destructibility should be recognized to increase free alienability.
B. Statutes
Contingent remainders created by wills could easily be held indestruc-
tible in order to carry out the testator's intention under the general statu-
tory rule of construction:
45. "The artificial and highly technical rules of the ancient common law are
not known or understood by the people generally or by the great majority of
persons who are called upon to prepare conveyances ." Frazer v. Super-
visors of Peoria County, 74 Ill. 282, 287 (1874).
46. ". . . there is a difference between declaring void what was previously
valid and declaring valid what was previously void, and the latter may be done
when the former would be improper short of legislative action." Hudson, Execu-
tory Limitations of Property in Missouri (1916) 11 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 3, 49.
47. These articles appear in the U. of Mo. BULL. L. SER. Some of them
are cited in this article.
48. Hudson, Estates Tail in Missouri (1913) 1 U. of Mo. BULL. L. SER. 5,
28; Hudson, Land Tenure and Conveyances in Missouri (1915) 8 id. at 3, 20;
Hudson, Executory Limitations of Property in Missouri (1916) 11 id. at 3, 48.
49. Cullen & Fisher, The Moder Rule Against Perpetuities and Legal
Contingent Remainders in Missouri (1936) 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 31, 48, 53, 54, 59, 62.
50. Ely, Can an Estate Tail be Docked During Life of First Taker? (1931)
45 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 3, 12-14, 19-21.
51. Compare Steiner, Estates Tail in Missouri (1939) 7 K. C. L. REV. 93,
which ignores the destructibility problem.
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"All courts and others concerned in the execution of last
wills shall have due regard to the directions of the will, and the
true intent and meaning of the testator, in all matters brought
before them." 52
Destruction of contingent remainders is clearly contrary to the testator's
intention in most cases. The courts often append a qualification to the
intent rule-- 'unless it contravenes some established rule of law.' "' This
exception to the intent rule undoubtedly includes the rule against perpe-
tuities, and perhaps the rule against the creation of a new kind of inheri-
tance. 54  At least the rule against perpetuities serves desirable social and
economic purposes today. The destructibility rule is merely a trap for
the unwary, serving no useful function in present-day society. Even if
the destructibility rule had ever obtained in Missouri, it is submitted
that it is not the kind of "established rule of law" the exception refers to,
and that the statute should therefore control. Unfortunately, the statute
in terms applies only to wills, and not to deeds, but the statute makes
clear that the policy of the state is to carry out the grantor's intent, and
the rule could be expanded to cover deeds.
Missouri has been prolific in the production of limitations purporting
to create fees tail. The fee tail statute55 converts the fee tail into life estate
and contingent remainder.5 8 One strong court, in a well reasoned opinion,
held that a contingent remainder created by a fee tail statute identical
with the Missouri statute was indestructible.5 7  There is no reason why
Missouri should not follow this authority.58
The celebrated case of Reeve v. Long"9 made an important exception to
the destructibility rule. A devised to B for life, remainder to B's first son.
B died, leaving his wife great with child. The question was whether this
posthumous son could take, the objection being the gap in seisin between
the termination of B's life estate and the birth of the remainderman. The
courts of Common Pleas and King's Bench unanimously held the remainder
was destroyed, but the House of Lords held that the posthumous son
52. 1 Mo. Ra-y. STAT. (1939) § 568.
53. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S. W. (2d) 685, 686(1934), and many others.
54. Johnson v. Whiton, 159 Mass. 424, 34 N. E. 542 (1893).
55. MO. REV. STAT. (1939) § 3498. The statute is set out in n. 19, supra.
56. Emerson v. Hughes, 110 Mo. 627, 19 S. W. 979 (1892).
57. Frazer v. Supervisors of Peoria County, 74 Ill. 282 (1874). This case
is discussed at p. 274, supra.
58. Contra: Ely, loc. cit. supra note 50. The fee tail case is the one where
Ely would apply the destructibility rule, in order to increase alienability.
59. 3 Lev. 408 (K. B. 1695).
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could take.60 The professional judges were much dissatisfied, for at that
time a decision changing the land law carried the same impact a constitu-
tional law decision does today."' "To obviate all doubts respecting the
law in this case, the statute of 10 Will. III. c. 16.62 was passed, by which
it was enacted, that where any estate is, by marriage, or any other settle-
ment, settled in remainder to children, with remainders over, any post-
humous child may take in the same manner as if born in the father's
lifetime. It is singular that this statute does not expressly mention limi-
tations or devises made by wills. There is a tradition, that, as the case
of Reeve v. Long arose upon a will, the lords considered the law to be
settled by their determination in that case; and were unwilling to make
any express mention of limitations or devises made in wills, lest it should
appear to call in question the authority or propriety of their determination.
Besides, in the above case of Reeve v. Long, the words of the act may be
construed, without much violence, to comprise settlements of estates made
by will, as well as settlements of estates made by deed."
63
In the case of a contingent remainder created by deed, Missouri
adopted by decision the exception set out in Reeve v. Long. 4 In 1845 Mis-
souri enacted a statute based on the English statute:
"When an estate hath been or shall be, by any conveyance,
limited in remainder to the son or daughter, or to the use of the
son or daughter of any person to be begotten, such son or daughter
born after the decease of his or her father shall take the estate in
the same manner as if he or she had been born in the lifetime
of the father, although no estate shall have been conveyed to sup-
port the contingent remainder after his death . ,,"
The language is awkward and punctuation is lacking, but the purpose of
the statute is clear in view of its origin.
6 6
60. ". . . as late as 1834 the- House [of Lords] decided a case without
the presence of any professional lawyer . . . 1 HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY Op
ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1922) 376-7.
61. "But all the Judges were much dissatisfied with this judgment of the
Lords, nor did they change their opinions thereupon, but very much blamed
Baron Turton for permitting it to be found specially where the law was so clear
and certain." Reeve v. Long, 3 Lev. 408 (K. B. 1695).
62. 10 & 11 Wm. III c. 16 (1699); 4 STAT. (1769) 13-14.
63. 2 Co. LITr. 298a, n. 3.
64. Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 560 (1869). This case is analyzed and
discussed on p. 286, infrca.
65. Mo. Rxsv. STAT. (1939) § 3502. The omitted part reads as follows:
"And hereafter an estate of freehold or of inheritance may be made to commence
in future by deed, in like manner as by will." This was not in the original
English statute, and has no connection with the posthumous child case. This
part of the statute is discussed on p. 286.
66. The statute is meant to cover the following case: A grants or devises to
B for life, remainder to B's children. The statute saves the contingent remainder
for B's posthumous child. Literally the statute might be applied to the following
14
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The end is not yet. In Miller v. Miller,7 Burch, J.,O completely abol-
ished the destructibility of contingent remainders, in a masterly opinion
based on a statute identical with a Missouri statute. In 1904 A granted
to B for life, remainder for life to B's wife C, remainder in fee to the sur-
viving issue of B. In 1905 B repudiated his life estate. In 1906 C bought
B's life estate at an execution sale for alimony. A then brought this action
to cancel the conveyance and to quiet title against B, C, and two children
of B and C. A argued that the contingent remainders had been destroyed
by a lack of a particular estate to support them. The court held that the
contingent remainders were not destroyed. The pertinent part of the
opinion is worth quoting.
"The territorial legislature of 1855 passed an act relating to con-
veyances which dealt with the subject of the creation of future estates as
follows:
" 'When an estate hath been, or shall be, by any conveyance,
limited in remainder to the son or daughter, or to the use of the
son or daughter of any person to be begotten, such son or daugh-
ter, born after the decease of his or her father, shall take the estate,
in the same manner as if he or she had been born in the lifetime of
the father, although no estate shall have been conveyed to support
the contingent remainder after his death. And, hereafter, an
estate of freehold, or of inheritance, may be made to commence in
future by deed, in like manner as by will.' (Statutes of Kansas
Territory, 1855, ch. 26, § 9.)I9
"In 1859 the act of 1855 regulating conveyances was revised, and
section 9 was condensed and restated as follows:
" 'Estates may be created, to commence at a future day.'
(Kansas Statutes, 1859, ch. 30, § 6.)
case: A grants or devises to B for life, remainder to the children of C. C dies,
B dies, and then a posthumous son is born to C. Does the statute apply?
MO. REV. STAT. (1939) § 3503, provides: "A future estate, depending on the
contingency of the death of any person without heirs or issue, or children, shall
be defeated by the birth of a posthumous child of such person, capable of taking
by descent." This Section should not be confused with Section 3502. Section 3503
applies to the following type limitation: A grants to B and his heirs, but if B
dies without issue him surviving, then over to C and his heirs. A posthumous
child is born to B. C will not take. Whether the posthumous child takes depends
on whether B still owns the land at his death, as the posthumous child takes by
descent if at all and not by purchase. As to the validity in Missouri of a shifting
executory interest, see Hudson, supra note 46, at 14-29.
67. 91 Kan. 1, 136 Pac. 953 (1913).
68. Rousseau A. Burch is one of the great judges in the United States.
His technique in the principal case is as beautiful as anything Cardozo has done.
See Burch's opinion in Foote v. Wilson, 104 Kan. 191, 178 Pac. 430 (1919).
69. This section is identical with Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 3502. The mean-ing of the second sentence is discussed in Eckhardt, The Work of the Missouri
Supreme Court for the Year 1938 (Property) (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 419, 419-420.
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"This act remained in force until repealed in 1868, when another
revision occurred. In this revision section 6 of the act of 1859 was
omitted and the subject was covered by a declaration as general as it was
possible to make.
" 'Conveyances of land, or of any other estate or interest
therein, may be made by deed, executed by any person having au-
thority to convey the same, or by his agent or attorney, and may
be acknowledged and recorded as herein directed, without any
other act or ceremony whatever.' (Gen. Stat. 1868, ch. 22, § 3.)70
"The words, 'conveyances of land,' mean, of course, the land itself
in fee simple absolute. The words, 'any other estate or interest therein,'
include estates of freehold and less than freehold, of inheritance and not of
inheritance, absolute and limited, present and future, vested and con-
tingent, and any other kind a grantor may choose to invent, consistent,
of course, with public policy.
"The doctrine of the particular estate arose from the necessity under
the feudal system of always having a tenant to fulfill feudal duties, defend
the estate, and represent it so that other claimants might maintain their
rights. The only way to pass a freehold estate was by livery of seisin
which operated immediately or not at all, and if the freehold became
vacant the lord had an immediate right of entry and all limitations of the
tenancy came to an end. The result was that in order to create a freehold
estate, the enjoyment of which was to be postponed to a future time, it was
necessary to support it by a precedent particular estate taken out of the
inheritance, and to make livery of seisin to the particular tenant, which
by fiction inured to the remainder man or remainder men. A much more
liberal and equitable doctrine applied to the transmission of estates by will.
" 'An executory devise of lands is such a disposition of them
by will, that thereby no estate vests at the death of the devisor,
but only on some future contingency. It differs from a remainder
in three very material points; 1. That it needs not any particular
estate to support it. 2. That by it a fee-simple, or other less es-
tate, may be limited after a fee-simple. 3. That by this means a
remainder may be limited of a chattel interest, after a particular
estate for life created in the same.' (2 B1. Com., p. *172.)
"The legislature of 1855 placed conveyances by deed on the same
footing as wills so far as the creation of future estates was concerned,
but following the lead of the legislatures of some of the older states, the
Kansas legislature of 1868 undertook not only to permit the granting of
70. This section is identical with Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1939) § 3401.
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future estates but to abolish other common-law restrictions on alienation
not suited to allodial tenures and modern conveyancing, and to make
transfers of interests in land as free as possible. The concluding portion
of section 3 of the act of 1868, quoted above, expressly abolishes the com-
mon-law ceremony of livery of seisin, which stood as an insuperable bar
to the creation of freeholds to begin in futuro unless supported by a par-
ticular estate. The language was adopted from statutes of other states,
which usually provided that deeds duly acknowledged and recorded should
be valid and pass estates in land 'without livery of seisin, attornment, or
other ceremony whatever.'
"It follows that the remainders to [0] and to the [issue] of [B]
do not require the support of the life estate to [B] in order to be valid.'"'
The Missouri statute is identical with the one relied on in Miller v.
Miller to completely abolish the destructibility rule. No reason is perceived
why Missouri should not adopt Burch's opinion if the case arises.72
C. Missouri Decisions
A diligent search has been made for Missouri cases, using the usual
media, including the Digest System and Corpus Juris. Very few cases
were found in this way. Most of the cases were turned up in research on
other topics, and in fishing expeditions. It may be that other or better
cases exist in Missouri, but if they do they lie buried in an uncharted
waste.
1. Cases where remainderman fails to satisfy a condition precedent
A contingent remainderman must satisfy any conditions precedent
in order to take. It is sometimes said that the failure of a contingent
remainderman to satisfy a condition precedent destroys the remainder.
Such a destruction is simply carrying out the intention of the creator of
the interest, and as such it is desirable. This kind of destruction is very
different from either the natural or artificial destructibility which is
71. The case is approved, and the effect of the statute is ably and exhaustively
treated in Foster, Does the Doctrine of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders
Exist in Nebraska? (1928) 6 NEB. L. BuI.L. 390.
72. The court in Miller v. Miller analyzes the limitation as creating a life
estate, a remainder for life, and contingent remainders in fee. This is the correct
analysis. An alternative construction is to consider that B's repudiated life
estate never existed at all, by a fiction of relation back. Then any future interest
which is not accelerated must be an executory interest. Executory interests of
course are indestructible. This executory interest construction was used in
Crossan v. Crossan, 303 Mo. 572, 262 S. W. 701 (1924), to avoid destructibility.
[Vol. 6
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based on obsolete feudal doctrines and which defeat the creator's legitimate
intention.
In Owen v. Eaton,73 T bequeathed the interest on $2500 to his widow
for life, and the principal at her death "to my son, Lanson Eaton, or his
heirs if he should not be alive." Lanson Eaton died before the life
tenant. The court held that he had a remainder subject to the express
condition precedent of survival, and consequently he took nothing when
he failed to survive.74 In Donaldson v. Donaldson,75 A conveyed to B for
life, then to his children in fee, "and if he has not children alive then
one-third of the real estate is to go to his widow and the rest to return
back to his parents." One child of the life tenant conveyed his interest and
then predeceased the life tenant. The court held the remainder was con-
tingent on surviving the life tenant, that the condition had not been
satisfied, and that, therefore, the transferee of the contingent remainder
got nothing. Both of these decisions are sound.
2. Dicta recognizing the destructibility rule
No Missouri case has been found which holds that a contingent remain-
der is destructible by the determination of the particular estate of freehold.
Not even a deliberately stated dictum in favor of destructibility has been
found.
The destructibility rule has been mentioned without disapproval in
two Missouri cases by way of dictum. In Payne v. Payne,78 A conveyed
to B for life, but no remainder was expressed. In reaching the obvious
conclusion that there was no remainder, the court discussed remainders
generally, saying in part: "A remainder is supported and preceded by
a particular estate, and is created at the same time and by the same
instrument."7 7  This was pure dictum. In Norman v. Horton,8 the court
again discussed remainders generally, and quoted from Blackstone: " 'Con-
tingent or executory remainders (whereby no present interest passes)
are where the estate in remainder is limited to take effect, either to a
73. 56 Mo. App. 563 (1894).
74. The issue in the case does not appear from the report. The decision is
that "the sum of money indicated should be paid to his heirs upon the death of
the wife." (p. 569) The court then says (p. 571), "It was no gift to Lanson or
his heirs (claiming by descent) unless he was alive at the time fixed for his
enjoyment of the gift." It would seem to make no difference from the point of
view of the executor whethei the heirs took by descent or by purchase.
75. 311 Mo. 208, 178 S. W. 686 (1925).
76. 119 Mo. 174, 24 S. W. 781 (1893).
77. Id. at 178.
78. 344 Mo. 290, 126 S. W. (2d) 187 (1939).
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dubious or uncertain person, or upon a dubious or uncertain event; so that
the particular estate may chance to be determined, and the remainder never
take effect. 2 B1. Comm. *168, *169.' -79 The statement was dictum, for
destructibility was not in issue. In both cases the dicta were neither perti-
nent, nor made after deliberation, but were thrown in as makeweight in
general discussions taken largely from texts.
The few other cases which recognize the doctrine only to refuse to
apply it are mentioned in subsequent sections.
3. Case holding contingent remainder in posthumous child is inde-
structible
The only case in Missouri which contains a discussion of destructibility
and indicates that the court understood the significance of the problem
and its historical background is Aubuchon v. Bender.0 In this case,
Missouri by judicial decision"' applies to deeds the rule of Reeve v. Long, 2
that where land is devised to B for life, remainder to his children, a
posthumous child may take. This rule, of course, permits a gap in seisin
between the life tenant's death and the birth of the remainderman.83
79. Id. at 298.
80. 44 Mo. 560 (1869).
81. The conveyance was made in 1844, and therefore was not controlled by
the statute adopted in 1845. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 3502.
82. Reeve v. Long and its ramifications are discussed on p. 280, supra.
Reeve v. Long was concerned with a limitation in a will.
83. The facts of the case were as follows: Adolph Dantin had a wife,
Cecile, and five children by her, Adolph, Francois, Cecile, Therese, and Louise.
In view of a contemplated divorce which was granted in May, 1844, Adolph, in
April, 1844, executed a covenant to stand seised of certain real estate "for his
own use during his natural life, and after his death the use, benefit, usufruct and
title to the same shall revert to and vest in his said five children above named,
and such other children in lawful wedlock by him begotten as shall be living at
the time of his death, and their heirs, without the power on the part of said
Adolph to sell, alienate, in any wise encumber, or dispose of said lot of ground
and appurtenances, for a period longer than his natural life." Four or five years
later Adolph married Amanda, by whom he had six children, twao of whom pre-
deceased Adolph, and one of whom was posthumous. In 1857 Adolph conveyed
part of the premises to Castello, in trust for his wife Amanda for life, remainder
to their joint issue. Adolph also made a will in 1853, giving everything to Amanda
during widowhood, remainder to her children by him. Adolph died in 1859. The
divorced wife, Cecile and her children bring ejectment for the land against
Amanda, but Amanda died pending the suit, and the suit was revived against her
executor Bender, and her four minor children.
The court construed the limitation in the settlement as creating a life estate
in Adolph, vested remainders in his children by Cecile, and remainders contingent
on surviving in his children by Amanda. On the basis of this analysis, Reeve v.
Long was adopted by decision.
Even though I weaken the authority of a case supporting my contention
that contingent remainders are indestructible, I must say that the court's analysis
of this limitation is open to question. At common law a man could not convey
to himself, hence Adolph did not create a life estate in himself. Livery of
seisin had to be a present act, and could not take effect in the future; hence the
interest in the children could not have been created at common law, but is
[Vol. 6
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The court in all solemnity proclaimed a declaration of independence
in property law. "Secondly, it appears that one of the children of Amanda
Dantin, was born after the death of her husband, and plaintiffs also claim
that he has no interest in the remainder, as he was not living at the time
of his father's death. In the days when subtleties of statement were
suffered to control rights of property and inheritance, it was held that a
posthumous child, not being in esse, could not take a contingent remainder,
unless an intermediate estate was provided upon which it could rest.
But the practical sense of modern jurisprudence has so sifted that vast
pile of wisdom and rubbish, comprising the common law of tenures, that
justice and reason are no longer the slaves of technical consistency. A child
unborn will now not only inherit all manner of estates, but take remainders,
whether vested or contingent, as though living when the particular estate
determined; and it matters not whether, in the technical statement of the
case, we say that the estate was suspended until his birth, or that it
vested en ventre sa mere, or vested in the person next entitled to it, and
divested and reinvested at his birth, it is settled by adjudication as well as
legislation that the remainder-man shall not be deprived of his estate,
although born after the determination of the particular estate.
This statute when adopted by us was but an affirmance of what had already
become the law.'1 4 (Italics mine)
4. Cases calling a contingent remainder an executory interest and
holding it indestructible
The conceptual distinction between remainders and executory interests
was sharply draw at common law. Purefoy v. Rogers85 provided a practical
reason for distinguishing the interests, conceptual contingent remainders
being destructible, and conceptual executory interests being indestructible.
effective as a springing executory interest after the Statute of Uses. The proper
construction, therefore, would seem to be a fee simple defeasible in Adolph,
subject to a springing executory interest in the children of both marriages. Such
an executory interest everywhere would be indestructible by acts of the parties,
and the posthumous child could take without any question of a gap in seisin. The
only question as to the posthumous child would be whether he fell under the
description "living at the time of [Adolph's] death." This problem could be
resolved easily as a matter of intention. Hence the five children of the first
marriage, and four of the second marriage are tenants in common, each with
one-ninth interest, (ignoring the descent of the share of Francois, who died in
1845). See my discussion of Goins v. Melton, 343 Mo. 413, 121 S. W. (2d) 821
(1938), in The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1988 (Property)
(1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 419, 419-21.
84. 44 Mo. 560, 568 (1869).
85. 2 Wms. Saund. 380 (K. B. 1670).
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This article is an argument that contingent remainders also are indestruc-
tible in Missouri. Other alleged differences will be considered in subsequent
articles. If the incidents of contingent remainders and executory interests
are the same, there is no longer any reason to perpetuate their conceptual
differences.
In Missouri contingent remainders and executory interests were
treated as separate concepts by statute as early as 1835.80 The first case
in Missouri to consider the validity of a springing executory interest by
deed was O'Day v. Meadows.8 7  In this case is a fair text statement of
the learning on executory interests. The best text discussion is by Manley
0. Hudson.88
Already the Missouri court has gone far to obliterate any distinction
between the two concepts. Part of this process was unintentional. 9 Part
was the result of the court's willingness to call a contingent remainder an
executory interest if that would prevent a destruction of the interest.
In Crossan v. Crossan,0 testator devised to his widow for life, "after
which to revert to my daughters, Ida . . . and Rebecca . . . pro-
vided they shall well and tenderly care for my said wife . . . during
her. declining years . ." The widow renounced under the will. This
suit was for a construction of the will and partition. The plaintiffs are
the heirs of the testator, and the defendants are the daughters Ida and
Rebecca. The trial court held that the widow's renunciation did not destroy
the daughters' contingent interest, and that the fee was vested in the tes-
tator's heirs, subject to his widow's dower, and to divestment if the
daughters comply with the condition. The case was affirmed on this
point. "It is suggested that the devise to the daughters was a contingent
remainder, and that the nullification of the particular estate destroyed the
remainder. That is true. It destroyed the remainder, as such. It did not
destroy the devise to the daughters, as such. *When the renunciation of the
will ended the life estate, then the residence property stood as if testator
86. Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1835) § 4; Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1939) § 1715: "In case
* . . the ownership of the inheritance shall depend upon an executory devise,
or the remainder shall be contingent, so that such parties cannot be named, the
same shall be so stated in the petition."
87. 194 Mo. 588, 92 S. W. 637 (1906).
88. Hudson, loc. cit. supra note 46.
89. In Buxton v. Kroeger, 219 Mo. 224, 117 S. W. 1147 (1909), the court
gropes in a miasma of contingent remainders and executory interests for a clue
to an analysis of the limitation. The proper interpretation of the limitation may
be debatable, but none of the opinions is at all close, the majority opinion being
the worst.
90. 303 Mo. 572, 262 S. W. 701 (1924).
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had never provided for a life estate for his wife, but had first devised the
residence property to his daughters upon the same condition as now appears
in the will. . . . The change wrought by the renunciation merely
changes the technical name given the devise to the daughters, but does not
affect the substance of that devise, or defeat the intent of the testator in
imposing upon his daughters the condition named in the will."I" Destructi-
bility is avoided by construing what was originally a contingent remainder
as an executory interest, on the fiction of relation back.
In Buckner v. Buckner, 2 there was a devise in 1876 to testator's widow
for life, remainder to the children of testator's son. Eight children were
born to the son before the widow's death in 1892, and thereafter three
more were born. In a suit for a construction of the will, the trial court
excluded the afterborn children. The supreme court reversed the decision
of the lower court, saying: "The important question is to determine who
were intended by these terms to become the owners of the remainder de-
vised . . . And we hold it was not the intention of the testator to
exclude from participancy in the devise of said remainder interest, any
of the children of his son born of a lawful marriage, whether before or after
the death of the life tenant or their descendants. Unless this intention of
the testator is opposed to some principle of public policy or rule of law
governing devises of estates, it must be carried out . . . Such limita-
tions over are contingent remainders or executory devises as the case may
be. In the case at bar the limitation over became a vested remainder in
the lawful children of R. A. Buckner at the death of the life tenant who
took the title, subject however, to an executory devise to such other chil-
dren as should be born to him in lawful wedlock, who when born will
eo instanti become cotenants with those born before." 9'  Had the problem
of destructibility been mentioned by the court, the holding would be
decisive.94
The class gift cases present a very difficult problem of analysis. If
no children are yet born, then the future interest is a contingent remainder.
When the first class member is born, he is said to take a vested remainder
which opens up to let in children born later. If the afterborn children
91. Id. at 580, 262 S. W. at 703.
92. 255 Mo. 371, 164 S. W. 513 (1914).
93. Id. at 375, 377.
94. Contra: Festing v. Allen, 12 M. & W. 279 (Ex. 1843); White v.
Summers, [1908] 2 Ch. 256. Compare In re Lechmere & Lloyd, 18 Ch. D. 524(1881).
Missouri accomplished what the English courts were unable to do.
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take by way of remainder, their interest is destructible at common law.05
If they take by way of executory interest, their interest is indestructible
and the testator's intent is carried out." It is submitted that Buokner v.
Buckner is sound.97
5. Cases holding a contingent remainder is not destructible by merger
Determination of the particular estate by merger in the reversion was
the device used most often at common law for the artificial destruction of
contingent remainders. Missouri has a number of cases holding on the
facts that a contingent remainder is not destroyed by merger. In none
of these cases did the court discuss merger, although destructibility was
extensively discussed in one of the cases. Nevertheless, a clear holding on
the facts is entitled to considerable weight as a precedent. These cases
require detailed analysis.
In Schee v. Boone,"8 the Missouri court held on the facts that a con-
tingent remainder was not destroyed by merger. John Mantle died testate
in 1906, devising Blackacre to his widow for life, then "to my said daughter
Loretta B. Schee and to the heirs of her body at her death." The testator
was survived by his widow and two daughters, Loretta and Elizabeth. The
widow died. Loretta had two sons, Frank and John. In 1914 John and
his wife and the life tenant Loretta quitclaimed to Frank. In 1917 John
died, leaving surviving as his sole heir his daughter, Edna, the defendant.
At a date not mentioned, Elizabeth, the other daughter of the testator,
quitelaimed to Loretta who in 1919 quitclaimed to Frank. Frank now
brings suit for construction of the will, and to have his title declared
absolute. The defendant is the minor Edna who "is the only person inter-
ested in the lands other than the plaintiff, her interest being that of an
apparent heir of Loretta B. Schee, as a holder of a contingent interest
under the will of the testator."99 Judgment for the defendant was affirmed
95. Compare Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 560 (1869), where later class
members are said to take by way of contingent remainder.
96. See 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 61.
97. Compare Barkhoefer v. Barkhoefer, 204 S. W. 906 (Mo. 1918).
98. 295 Mo. 212, 243 S. W 882 (1922).
99. Id. at 219.
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by the supreme court. The judgment was not more particularly set out.
In effect it must have been that there was still an outstanding contingent
remainder. The court said that the remainder was contingent because the
identity of the remaindermen could not be established until the life tenant's
death. As heir apparent John had a contingent remainder, but when he
predeceased the life tenant his interest dropped out, and his daughter,
the defendant, heir of the body of the life tenant, had a contingent
remainder.
The facts of Sehee v. Boone present a typical situation for the appli-
cation of the doctrine of merger. At the time of the suit Frank had a
present life estate, and also the reversion.0 0 Merger should result if it is
permitted in the jurisdiction. The court held, however, that the contingent
remainder was still outstanding, and consequently that it had not been
destroyed by merger. Furthermore; the court says in strong language that
no conveyance by the life tenant could affect the contingent remainder.
"It also appears that the life tenant, Loretta B. Schee, has conveyed her
interest in these lands to the plaintiff. It is scarcely necessary to say that
the interest thus acquired by the plaintiff can be no greater than that of
the grantor, which is the right of use and occupancy during her life.
Certainly this conveyance can have no effect upon the rights or interests
of the 'heirs of her body at her death.' As to who may come within this
category can only be determined upon the demise of Loretta B. Schee. Her
apparent heirs, so far as the facts now disclose, are the plaintiff and Edna
M. Schee."''1
In Fountain v. Starbuck,10 2 there was a deliberate attempt by one of
the parties to destroy a contingent remainder. The court held on the facts
that the contingent remainder was not destroyed by merger, and condemned
the attempt to destroy contingent remainders with the strongest language
100. A reversion always follows a contingent remainder in fee. Nothing is
said in the opinion as to what happened to this reversion, and consequently we
must resolve the problem by inference. We are not given the residuary clause
nor told if there was one, but the part of the will quoted gave all the personalty
to the testator's two daughters, and all of the land to testator's widow for life,
then 811 acres of his real estate to Loretta for life, remainder to the heirs of her
body, and all the rest of his real estate, 1054 acres, to his daughter Elizabeth, &c.
Thus it is a fair assumption that if there was a residuary clause disposing of
the reversion it was in favor of one or more of the above members of the testator's
family. But since he had disposed of all his property, real and personal, perhaps
there was no residuary clause, in which case the reversion would descend to his
heirs. Everybody who possibly could have been interested in the reversion quit-
claimed to Frank. Therefore Frank must have owned both the life estate and
the reversion.
101. 295 Mo. at 225.
102. 209 S. W. 900 (Mo. 1919).
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in the books. Archibald Fountain devised Blackaere to his son Joseph
and the heirs of his body. This limitation created a life estate and con-
tingent remainder under the fee tail statute. Joseph married in 1895 and
had two children in 1897. The life tenant then decided to sell the land
to Ira Starbuek; "they agreed upon the price of $1000, and consulted
lawyers as to how the remainder of plaintiffs might be barred." The 1896
taxes had already been paid, but it was agreed the 1897 taxes should
remain delinquent, Starbuck to become the purchaser at the tax sale.
Starbuck took possession, and the tax proceedings passed to judgment and
sale at which Starbuck became the purchaser. "There is no evidence,
either direct or circumstantial, that either of [Joseph's] children ever
received any benefit from this land or the proceeds of the sale." In 1912
Starbuck died, devising the land to his children, the defendants. In 1914
the children of Joseph (who was still alive) brought a proceeding "to
secure an adjudication of their title as remaindermen in the 40 acres of
land in question contingent upon their survival of their father." The
trial court found for the plaintiffs, and set aside and cancelled the sheriff's
deed under the tax sale, subject to the estate of the defendants for the life
of Joseph. The supreme court affirmed the decision, so far as the tax
deed is avoided where it purports to divest the plaintiff's contingent
interests.
"The real and only question for determination is whether the sheriff's
deed . . . was fraudulent, and therefore voidable as to these plaintiffs.
This presents little difficulty, as there is no dispute as to the facts. The
life tenant and father was, as the subsequent facts demonstrate, about to
vanish from the place in which he had been born and raised and married
and his little children born. The latter are plaintiffs, and were seized of a
contingent remainder in the land, which he desired to sell and thereby
convert into money. Mr. Starbuck was equally desirous of purchasing it
for the enlargement of his extensive farm which adjoined it. No honest
way occurred to them, nor does any such way now occur to its, by which
this could be done. Mr. Fountain was their natural guardian, and as
life tenant it was his duty for their benefit to pay taxes as they should
become due . . . There was no hardship in this, as the land was pro-
ductive and Mr. Starbuck was in possession during the pendency of the
tax proceeding, paying him $60 per year rental. He was not in a state
of poverty, for the evidence shows that he had horses and cattle, like other
prosperous farmers. Under these circumstances it was agreed between him
and Starbuck that he would be false to his trust, permit the taxes to
[Vol. 6
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become delinquent, and the land to be sold under the tax judgment to
be procured by the state, so that Starbuck might acquire the title for the
sum of $1000 to be paid to him. Had there been no bond of kinship in
the transaction, and the remaindermen been adults, the scheme would
have been dishonest. When we consider the relation of parent and child,
and the tender age and absolute helplessness of the latter, it is difficult to
describe the turpitude which it suggests. The wrong was entire, but it
took them both to perpetrate it, and both were equally guilty. They acted
with deliberation, consulting lawyers as they proceeded, but it is gratifying
to note that these voluntarily deny their concurrence in the act by which
the children were deprived of the careful bounty of their grandfather.
They realized fully that they were on dangerous ground, as vividly appears
from the testimony of one of the defendants at the trial that they discussed
the matter together, and that when the other heirs conveyed to the defend-
ant Clarence they agreed that with respect to this transaction they would
'stand together.' Under these circumstances, it is unnecessary that the
adjective 'constructive' should precede the word which expressed the char-
acter of the transaction [fraud]. It is a word that, in favor of the injured
and against the guilty, avoids all transactions into which it enters, even
the judgments of courts and the solemn deeds by which such judgments
are finally executed." 10 3  (Italics mine)
The court does not discuss merger, but it would seem that the issue
103. Id. at 901.
If there is actual fraud here, it would seem not to be by Fountain in his
capacity as life tenant, but by Fountain in his capacity as natural guardian of
his children. Such a relationship never presented destructibility by merger
at common law.
Compare Warfield v. Bixby, 51 F. (2d) 210 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931). Testator
bequeathed personal property to his widow and son for life, then to the lineal
descendants of the son, but if the son should die without lineal descendants, to the
heirs of [testator's] brothers. The testator's brothers died, leaving Alice Warfield
as an heir. In 1913 the widow and son purchased for $25,000 an undivided
one-half of the contingent interest of Alice Warfield, representing that the entire
estate was worth about $8,000,000. They failed to disclose that there was an
additional sum of about $600,000 still to be accounted for, and also failed to
disclose that the son could never become a father. After the death of the son
and widow, Alice Warfield, now entitled as remainderman, brings this bill to
have her 1913 conveyance set aside, and for an accounting, on the theory that
the widow, and son breached a fiduciary relationship with her by not making a
complete disclosure. The court held that there was no fiduciary relationship
between a life tenant and remainderman which would prevent a purchase at arm's
length by the life tenant from the remainderman. No problem of destructibility
was involved because the contingent remainder was in personal property.
The court said, (p. 214): "The relation of a life tenant to a remainderman
or reversioner, is that of a quasi trustee. He is a trustee in the sense only that
he must not injure or dispose of the property to the injury of the rights of the
remainderman, and can do nothing during the continuance of his trust to impair
the corpus of the property." This would seem to indicate that artificial destruc-
tion of a contingent remainder by merger would not be permitted.
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was present on the facts. The testator's reversion following the contingent
remainder probably went to the life tenant.'0 4 Starbuck acquired both
the life estate and the reversion at the tax sale. Since the court holds the
contingent remainder still exists, it necessarily holds merger did not occur.
The supreme court, speaking through Dalton, C., delivered one of its
best property opinions in recent years in the case of Lewis v. Lewis.105
Hugh Lewis, Sr., died testate in 1896, survived by his widow, Adaline,
and by five children, one of whom was Addie Lee. By item four of his
will, he devised to his" daughter, Addle Lewis, for the term of her life, and
at her death to the heirs of her body, absolutely," the real estate here
involved. By item seven he devised the residue of his estate to his widow,
Adaline. In 1899 the widow and the other four children quitelaimed to
Addie Lee all their interest in the land described in item four. Addie
Lee, unmarried, over seventy-five years of age, without issue of body,
petitions for a declaratory judgment that she has a fee simple absolute,
joining as defendants all living descendants of the testator and his widow. 0 0
The trial court entered judgment declaring that the plaintiff "did become
vested with the fee simple title to the real estate described in the petition
subject to be divested upon the plaintiff, Addie Lee Lewis, having heirs of
the body." Judgment was affirmed by the supreme court. "We hold that
respondent has a life estate in the real estate described and a vested
reversionary interest in fee, which reversionary interest in fee is subject
only to being divested in the event of respondent's death, leaving surviving
her, heirs of her body. The estate which respondent has is, in effect, a
fee-simple title which she may transfer by deed or will or which will pass
by descent, and which fee-simple title will be defeated only in the event
that at her death respondent is survived by heirs of her body." 10 7
104. The rest of the will is not given in the opinion. If the reversion did
not go to the testator's son either by residuary devise, or by descent in whole orin part, this case is not a holding on merger, but it is nevertheless a powerful
dictum against destructibility.
105. 345 Mo. 816, 136 S. W. (2d) 66 (1940).106. The principal issue in the case arose under item eight: "If any of my
children named in this, my last will and testament, shall die without issue living
at the time of his or her death, capable of inheriting, then, and in that case, it is
my will, that my dearly beloved wife, if living, and such of my said children as
may then be living shall take in equal parts all the property by the terms of this
will given and devised to such deceased child . . ." The defendant's claimed
an alternative contingent remainder but the court held that none existed, on the
theory that "die without issue living at the time of his or her death" refers tothe death of Addie Lee before the testator's death, a substitutionary gift. Most
of the opinion is concerned with this problem.
107. Compare the language of the trial court, "fee-simple title subject to bedivested," with the accurate analysis and terminology of Dalton, C., "life estate,
vested but defeasible reversion, contingent remainder." He then properly adds
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In the two cases previously discussed, the court did not recognize
that a reversion existed after a contingent remainder. In Lewis v. Lewis,
the court expressly discusses the reversion, and expressly finds that the
reversion and the life estate are in one person.108 Thus there can be no
doubt that this is a case for destruction of a contingent remainder by
merger if the court will permit it. No holding on the facts that a con-
tingent remainder is indestructible could be more definitive. It is unfor-
tunate that the court did not mention destructibility in express terms, to
remove any last iota of doubt.10 9
Livery of seisin is obsolete in Missouri, and no example of tortious
feoffment appears in the cases. It is almost inconceivable that a Missouri
court would hold a contingent remainder destroyed on the ground the
particular estate had been determined by a tortious feoffment.110
V. CoNcLusIoN
It is submitted that contingent remainders are indestructible in
Missouri under existing statutes and decisions. No Missouri case has been
that this is "in effect" a defeasible fee simple. The conclusion would seem to be
that the result is the same whether one calls the future interest a contingent
remainder or a shifting executory interest.
108. 136 S. W. (2d) at 71: "Upon the death of the testator the reversionary
interest in fee, in the real estate described, vested in the widow Adaline Lewis,
subject to the life estate and the contingent remainder devised under item 4 of
the will. . . . The reversionary interest in said real estate, which, by reason
of item 7 of the will became vested in the widow Adaline Lewis, was the proper
subject of conveyance by deed, and it was conveyed by deed by the said Adaline
Lewis in her lifetime to respondent, in whom it is now vested. . . . The [re-
version] conveyed to respondent was a vested interest, subject to being divested
upon certain conditions, but it has not been divested, and will not be divested,
except in the event that respondent is survived by heirs of the body."
109. Any rules which limit the merger of interests in land help to limit the
scope of the destructibility doctrine, if such exists.
At common law if A conveys to B for life, then to his children him surviving,
and B later acquires one-half of the reversion, there is merger pro tanto, and
one-half of the contingent remainder is destroyed. To the effect that there is
no merger pro tanto in Missouri, see Willis v. Robinson, 291 Mo. 650, 237 S. W.
1030 (1922). The opinion is of the dream world, without facts and with unstated
issues. Space does not permit a complete analysis of the case, but I will say this
much: the court overlooked the perfectly obvious reason why there was no merger,
-iz., a conveyance by the life tenant to his "children" was not a conveyance to
his "heirs" except in retrospect.
See also Evans v. Rankin, 329 Mo. 411, 44 S. W. (2d) 644 (1931), in which is
made the statement, "The absence of any intei-vening estate is essential to a
merger." In its context the meaning of this statement is much more circum-
scribed than when uprooted and quoted alone.
Morgan v. York, 91 S. W. (2d) 244, 247 (Mo. App. 1936), a case involving
a purchase money mortgage, may serve as makeweight. "The doctrine of merger,
upon which appellants rely, has been repeatedly declared to be technical and our
courts have frequently said that mergers are not favored, either in courts of law
or equity. .
110. Consult Hudson, supra note 48, 8 U. oF Mo. BULL. L. SEn. at 3.
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1941], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss3/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
found which holds a contingent remainder destructible. Many Missouri
cases hold contingent remainders indestructible. Statutes limit destructi-
bility, and probably completely abolish the doctrine.
Nevertheless, it is respectfully submitted that legislation should be
enacted as an added precaution to avoid any possibility of a Bond v. Moore
which might discredit the bar, the bench, and the legislature in the eyes
of the public. The exact form of such legislation is not here suggested,
but a statute for submission to the legislature might well be drawn up
with the assistance of the conveyancing bar and the property teachers in
Missouri.
In England the doctrine was abolished piecemeal. Their statutory
forms are not particularly desirable."' The form suggested by Kales for
Illinois lacks the desirable clarity and incisiveness. 1 2  The form finally
used in Illinois is much simpler. 1 3 Many of the states have followed the
New York forms."' The American Law Institute has under consideration
a Law of Property Act which includes a section abolishing the destructi-
bility'rule.115
Until the legislature acts to abolish the destructibility rule, or until
a case appears in which the supreme court repudiates the doctrine in its
reasoning as well as in its holding, the careful lawyer must assume that
contingent remainders are destructible, and use one or another of the
available techniques to avoid the rule.
111. For the text of the English forms, see n. 14, and n. 17, supra.
112. Kales, supra note 28, at 378: "No future interest whether of real or
personal property or created in a conveyance inter vivos or by will, taking effect,
in the case of a conveyance inter vivos upon complete execution and in the case
of a will by the death of the testator, on or after the first day of July, 1907,
shall be invalid or fail because of the non-happening of any condition precedent
to the taking in possession of the fut-dre interest either before or at the time of
the termination, whenever or in whatever manner that may occur, of the pre-
ceding estate expressly limited."
113. For the text of the Illinois form, see n. 19, supra.
114. NEw YoRx REAL PROPERTY LAW § 57: "An expectant estate cannot be
defeated or barred by any transfer or other act of the owner of the intermediate
or precedent estate, nor by any destruction of such precedent estate by disseizin,
forfeiture, surrender, merger or otherwise; but an expectant estate may be
defeated in any manner, or by any act or means which the party creating such
estate, in the creation thereof, has provided for or authorized. An expectant
estate thus liable to be defeated shall not, on that ground, be adjudged void
in its creation."
Id. § 58: "A remainder valid in its creation shall not be defeated by the
determination of the precedent estate, before the happening of the contingency
on which the remainder was limited to take effect; should such contingency
afterwards happen the remainder shall take effect in the same manner and to the
same extent as if the precedent estate had continued to the same period."
115. LAW OF PROPERTY ACT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1938) 16: "No
future interest, whether legal or equitable, shall be destroyed by the mere termi-
nation, in any manner, of any or all preceding interests before the happening of
the contingency to which the future interest is subject."
[Vol. 6
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